Welfare State Crime in Canada: The Politics of Tax Evasion in the 1980s by Sossin, Lorne
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1992 
Welfare State Crime in Canada: The Politics of Tax Evasion in the 
1980s 
Lorne Sossin 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, lsossin@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Sossin, Lorne, "Welfare State Crime in Canada: The Politics of Tax Evasion in the 1980s" Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 12 (1992): 98-127. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
WELFARE STATE CRIME IN CANADA:
THE POLITICS OF TAX EVASION IN THE 1980s
by
Lome Sossin*
This paper considers the phenomenon of tax evasion in the 1980s in
Canada as an outgrowth of a crisis in the welfare state. The lack of
social protest over the high incidence of tax evasion among the
wealthiest stratum of Canadian individuals and corporations is, on
this view, linked to the transformation of politicized citizens into
depoliticized clients. Tax evasion, along with legal tax avoidance both
proliferated in the 1980s which reflects the convergence of a number
of events including the increase in use of tax expenditures, the decreas-
ing emphasis on enforcement in tax administration, the rise of neocon-
servatism and, more generally, the internalization within the income
tax system of the contradictions of welfare state capitalism. This paper
suggests that the premise of the income tax within the framework of
the welfare state is needed and also advocates practical measures for
addressing both the high incidence and the social acceptability of tax
evasion in Canada.
Le crime contre I'Etat-providence au Canada:
ia politique de la fraude fiscale aux ann6es 80
Selon l'auteur, la fraude fiscale resulte d'une crise de l'Etat-provi-
dence. Si on ne proteste pas contre lafrequence de lafraude parmi les
personnes et commerces canadiens les plus riches, dit-il, c'est que nos
citoyens sont devenus des clients dpolitisgs. La fraude fiscale qui,
comme la d6robade fiscale Mgale, a prolifirg aux annees 80, a des
causes multiples, y compris l'usage augment des depenses comme
d~ductions des imp6ts, la verification moins assidue, la montge du
neo-conservatisme et, plus g6neralement, les contrecoups pour le
systeme fiscal des contradictions de l'Etat-providence capitaliste.
L'auteur pretend que l'imp6t sur le revenu fait partie intgrante de
l'Etat-providence, et ilpropose des mesures concretes pour lutter ci la
fois contre lafr~quence de la fraudefiscale au Canada et contre lefait
qu'elle ne choque personne.
Many taxpayers have little or no opportunity to avoid complying with the law.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is to critically analyze the incidence and
implications of tax evasion in Canada during the 1980s. More gener-
ally, I wish to explore whether tax evasion is criminal at all, and
additionally what makes it a particular kind of phenomenon unique to
the welfare state. I argue that the structures of the welfare state
legitimate tax evasion by constructing it as a minor regulatory infrac-
tion rather than as a violation of any esteemed social value. The rise
of the "New Right" in the 1980s and the concurrent alterations to the
income tax and its enforcement over this period has elevated tax
evasion into a crisis of the Canadian welfare state.
Tax evasion, I argue, should not be seen so much as a fraudulent
activity, but rather as a pathological response to the fraudulent logic
of the welfare state. It is not so much deviant or marginal conduct as
an exaggeration of conduct (namely, tax avoidance) that is explicitly
encouraged under Canada's income tax system. Tax evasion seems to
have been rendered socially acceptable in virtually all quarters of
society; however, the structure of the tax system ensures that, for the
most part, only the most advantaged taxpayers can profitably engage
in it. Corporations and high-income taxpayers are favourably posi-
tioned to evade income taxes, both because the Income Tax Act is
riddled with incentives for investment and the accumulation of profit,
and because those who earn income from business and property are
accorded more privacy in their economic conduct. Despite the egali-
tarian protestations of our liberal democratic institutions, privacy in
this context appears to be more of a privilege than a right in Canada.
Tax evasion, therefore, is as much aimed at depriving the welfare state
of administrative control, as it is aimed at depriving the public treasury
of revenue.
This essay is divided into four parts: the first introductory section
outlines what governmental mechanisms exist to investigate and pro-
secute tax evasion; the second part of the essay analyzes how the dy-
namics of the welfare state transform politically active citizens to
whom tax evasion would be socially unacceptable into depoliticized
clients for whom tax evasion is one of the perks of success in the
market; the third part examines how Canada's income tax system has
internalized the contradictions of the welfare state; and finally, the
fourth section of the essay explores the incidence and implications of
tax evasion itself and suggests, by way of a conclusion, an alternative
approach to addressing this phenomenon.
While most people have a tangible image in their head when they
speak of tax evasion, it is far from a precise categorization. Canada's
income tax system relies essentially on voluntary compliance. Every
resident of Canada or non-resident earning income in Canada has a
statutory obligation to file an income tax return with the government.
2
Compliance is easily assured in the case of salaried taxpayers as they
generally have their income tax deducted at the source of their em-
2 See sections 150(1) and 151 of the Income Tax Act.
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ployment. Typically, a larger amount is deducted than owed and thus
the majority of Canadian taxpayers receive a refund cheque after filing
their income tax return. In fact, more than 75 per cent of all returns
filed are for salaried employees who have their income tax withheld
by their employers and remitted directly to the government. 3 The
average income of these taxpayers is $25,554.4 Out of the 17,615,022
income tax returns filed in 1988, for example, 13,048,144 taxpayers
received refunds. 5 For individuals earning money from business,
property, or investments and for all corporations-generally the cate-
gories of taxpayers earning the highest incomes-the Department of
National Revenue must rely on the willingness of these taxpayers to
comply by revealing their taxable income to the department. When
taxpayers do not comply, however, the department has a variety of
mechanisms at its disposal to enforce a taxpayer's income tax liability;
these include audits, investigations, inquiries, and ultimately garnish-
ing wages, profits, and the seizure of assets.
6
The absence of compliance, to complicate matters, can constitute
either tax avoidance or tax evasion. Tax avoidance can lead to the
demand for repayment of the taxes in question and to the imposition
of civil penalties; tax evasion, on the other hand, may include these
consequences but additionally may lead to a criminal prosecution and,
in very rare cases, incarceration.7 More commonly, where the depart-
ment believes a taxpayer to have underreported or not reported taxable
income, a reassessment is issued and additional tax assessed with no
added penalty.
While tax evasion is by its definition illicit, tax avoidance has both
a legitimate and an illegitimate connotation, though it is often as
difficult to define as it is to enforce. All successful tax planning, after
3 In 1988, for example, this included 11,226,240 taxpayers out of the total
17,071,350 who filed. However, statistics on source deductions reveal that, in
actuality, 13,666,992 taxpayers were subject to deductions at source, which would
account for over 80% of all taxfilers. See Revenue Canada, Inside Taxation,
1988-89 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990) at 32 and 69; see also Revenue
Canada, Taxation Statistics, 1988 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990) at 77.
Simply because an individual earns income through salary, however, does not
mean they are disadvantaged. For high-income employees, a number of tax
minimization schemes are allowed by the Act including deferred income
arrangements, retirement planning packages and income splitting.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Table 2.
6 For a review of these powers see, N. Brooks & J. Fudge, Search and Seizure
Under the Income Tax Act (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985);
W. Innes, Tax Evasion in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987); Income Tax
Enforcement, Compliance and Administration: Corporate Management Tax
Conference 1988 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988); and Dealing with
Revenue Canada: The Art of Avoiding Expensive Mistakes (Toronto: The
Canadian Institute, 1990). See also Revenue Canada, Information Circular
71-14R3, "The Tax Audit," June 18, 1984; and Information Circular 73-10R3,
"Tax Evasion," February 13, 1987.
7 See sections 238 and 239 of the Act for the criminal sanctions; see sections 162
and 163 for the civil penalties.
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all, is aimed at a minimization or avoidance of taxes for the benefit of
the taxpayer.8 Determining which of the many schemes that have been
devised to attain this objective are legitimate and which are illegiti-
mate, and which then cross the line from avoidance to evasion, is a
discretionary authority vested in Revenue Canada and supervised by
the courts upon judicial review when such exercises of discretion are
challenged. The most recent statutory embodiment of this discretion
is contained in the new General Anti-Avoidance Rule enacted as part
of Finance Minister Michael Wilson's 1987 tax reform package. 9
Tax evasion is somewhat more distinctive as it entails a wilful act
or omission: either intentionally failing to file a return, omitting
income received, misrepresenting reported income, arranging for the
receipt of income in a jurisdiction outside the scrutiny of Revenue
Canada, or misrepresenting a transaction so as to gain a tax benefit.
The culpability of the tax evader, however, rests with the intent or
mens rea demonstrated.' 0 While tax evasion may thus be easier to
proscribe, it is more difficult to prosecute, especially when the alleged
tax evader is a corporate entity with potentially diffuse and multifari-
ous intentions. II
Before exploring the criminality of tax evasion in Canada in more
detail, however, it is first necessary to understand the political and
8 For the earliest judicial sanction of the principle of tax minimization, see Duke of
Westminster v. Inland Revenue Commission, [1936] A.C. I (H.L.). See also
Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services and D.M. Ritchie v. Commission of Internal
Revenue (1929), 14 T.C. 754 at 763 where it was held, "No man in this country
is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so as to arrange his legal relations
to his business or to his property so as to enable Inland Revenue to put the largest
possible shovel into his stores."
9 Section 245 of the Act; see V. Krishna, Tax Avoidance: The General Anti-
Avoidance Rule (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
10 See for a discussion of the importance of mens rea R. v. Hummel, [1971] C.T.C.
803 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), where Robinson J. held that the characterization of income
as capital, which at that time would have rendered the gain untaxed, was held to
itself not establish guilty intent. It is not clear if this test also includes wilful
blindness - that the taxpayer should have known that they were evading taxes
though they may have been under the subjective belief that they were not; see R.
v. Lundy (1972), 26 D.T.C. 6093 at 6116 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
I1 The other issue raised by the question of intent is to what extent the corporate veil
may be pierced to extend lability for tax evasion to officers, agents and directors
of corporations. Section 242 of the Act stipulates:
"Where a corporation is guilty of an offence under this Act, an officer, director
or agent of the corporation who directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in,
or participated in, the commission of the offence is a party to and guilty of the
offence and is liable on conviction to the punishment provided for the offence
whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted."
Corporations, though, are routinely charged with tax evasion in circumstances
where no officers or directors are charged. See for a discussion, W. Innes, Tax
Evasion in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 117-8.
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economic forces which serve to make tax evasion possible, desirable
and socially acceptable in Canada.
II. REVENUE, LEGITIMACY AND INEQUALITY: THE
WELFARE STATE IN CANADA
The welfare state refers to both a legislative scheme intended to
regulate and moderate the socioeconomic inequality fostered by the
market, and an administrative scheme intended to intervene in social
and economic life to enforce those legislative goals. While welfare
legislation may enhance beneficiaries' freedom by providing workers
with the right to organize or the indigent with financial security, it does
so by organizing the private lives of these dependent persons on a
contractual rather than consensual basis. This contractual relationship
between beneficiaries and the state imposes a calculus of liabilities
and benefits, rights and entitlements, on interaction that might other-
wise, ideally, embody political agreements on the distribution of needs
and resources. Citizens of the polity are transformed into clients of
public administration as this pattern of dependency develops. The
welfare state, on this view, results in the reification of social life, and
the administration of people as though they were things.
Once stripped of any meaningful inter-subjective content, and once
reliant on large, efficient bureaucracies, social relations in the welfare
state become ideally suited to the corporation-an artificial legal
entity made up not of people, but of contractual parties. This system
depends for its existence and stability not on political mechanisms for
establishing and actualizing the collective will of the citizenry, but on
legal mechanisms for defining and enforcing contracts. The increasing
juridification of both private and public bureaucracies has been largely
complementary. As Gerald Frug has observed, "[t]he law defines,
perpetuates, explains, justifies and reassures us about bureaucratic
organization."' 2 Others have gone further, of course, arguing that the
role of law in enforcing contracts is itself fundamentally ideological.,
3
I argue that the increasing clientelization of the Canadian citizenry is
consistent with the increasing legalization of tax administration wit-
nessed in the 1980s.1
4
The premise and the purpose of the welfare state is, in short, to
absorb and depoliticize socioeconomic struggles; this is accomplished
through the pervasive organization and supervision of social relations
and intense legal and regulatory intervention in the market. However,
12 G. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Harvard L.
Rev. 1276 at 1285-6.
13 See R. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 HarvardL. Rev.
561 at 619; see also E. Mensch, "Contract Law as Ideology," in A. Hutchinson
ed., Critical Legal Studies (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.,
1989); and P. Gabel & J. Feinman, "Contract Law as Ideology," in D. Kairys, ed.,
The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon, 1982) 172.
14 See L. Sossin, "Revenue, Ideology and Legitimacy: The Politics of Canadian Tax
Administration, 1980-90," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., May 31, 1992.
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the behaviour of the market conforms to the needs and actions of
globally (or, at least, continentally) oriented corporate interests over
which the state exercises little influence. The state is thus fundamen-
tally reactive, and this structural relationship with market forces
provides both the rationale and necessity for the Keynesian policies
adopted by advanced capitalist states in the postwar era. 5
This regime of state intervention embodies a particular accommo-
dation between capital and labour that hinged on the full-time wage
earner being the norm for labour and the achievement of full employ-
ment. During the initial period of postwar growth and expansion, the
success of the full employment policies advocated by the British
economist John Maynard Keynes, and adopted by most advanced
capitalist states including Canada, suggested that this accommodation
could be sustained by the compensatory and redistributive structures
of the welfare state.16 By adjusting public spending and taxation in
reaction to the cyclical fluctuations of the market, rates of investment,
employment and industrial growth were susceptible to manipulation
and regulation by the state.
One area in which those class relations had become embedded in
the state apparatus is that of taxation. The welfare state must, if it is to
survive, design a system able to simultaneously obtain sufficient
revenue, encourage capitalist expansion and maintain overall legiti-
macy in the equity and fairness of the tax process. This is especially
critical in a tax system predicated on voluntary compliance where, if
15 It is because of this symbiotic relationship that some critical observers have argued
that "public" functions of social, political and economic regulation in the welfare
state have been increasingly transferred to "private" corporations, which, merely
because they are private, are not subject to the procedural due process rights and
entitlements that govern public bodies and agencies. See A. Hutchinson, "Mice
Under a Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State" (1990) 40
U.T.LJ. 374. See also J. Fox & M. Omstein, "The Canadian State and Corporate
Elites in the Postwar Period" (1986) 36 Can. Rev. Sociology and Anthropology
481.
16 See J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Interest, Employment and Money
(London: Macmillan, 1936); for a good summary of the economic strategy, its
rise and decline, see P. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State
Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
69-99. Peter Hall explains both the terms and the stakes of this Keynesian
compromise:
Up to this point, working-class political parties and the spokesmen for
capital had been locked in a virtually irreconcilable conflict. Labour
argued that the working-class goals of full employment and a reasonable
distribution of income could be attained only through nationalization of
the means of production. The supporters of private capital, of course,
opposed any arrangement that would have deprived them of ownership
and control over the means of production. The programs of the postwar
welfare state went some distance toward resolving the problem of income
distribution; but it was only the advent of Keynesianism that resolved the
conflict over full employment. If Keynesian policies worked, the working
class could be guaranteed full employment through the management of
aggregate demand, without depriving capitalists of ownership and control
over the investment and resource allocation decisions of industry.
Vol. 12
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citizens perceive the legitimacy of the tax system (or of the policies
in which tax revenues are invested) to be discredited, they can register
protest by avoiding or evading their tax burden. Indeed, popular tax
revolts continue to be one of the very few public issues capable of
galvanizing large-scale grass roots political participation. Recent
movements against the Goods and Services Tax and the Market Value
Assessment of Property Taxes illustrate the primacy taxes occupy in
the political psyche of Canada.
The welfare state has attempted to reconcile its competing mandates
by constructing a tax system that appears to be progressive and
redistributive, but in fact permits those with higher incomes and more
complex ways of obtaining income to avoid more of their tax burden,
and those with lower incomes to avoid less. This view is consistent
with James O'Connor's observation that:
tax struggle is the oldest form of class struggle ... the state must attempt to
establish equitable forms of taxation in order to conceal the inequitable content
of the tax structure and the exploitive nature of the class structure.[
7
In the operation of Canada's welfare state, class conflict is not
exacerbated by taxation so much as institutionalized by it.
Jurgen Habermas elaborates on the conflicting priorities of taxation
in welfare state capitalism:
(the state) bears the infrastructural costs directly related to production (trans-
portation and communications systems, scientific-technical progress, voca-
tional training).... It bears the costs of social consumption indirectly related to
production (housing construction, transportation, health care, leisure, educa-
tion, social security). It bears the costs of social welfare, especially unemploy-
ment [insurance].... In the end, these expenditures have to be financed through
taxes. The state apparatus is, therefore, faced simultaneously with two tasks.
On the one hand, it is supposed to raise the requisite amount of taxes by
skimming off profits and income and to use the available taxes so rationally
that crisis-ridden disturbances of growth can be avoided. On the other hand,
the selective raising of taxes, the discernible pattern of priorities in their use,
and the administrative performances themselves must be so constituted that
the need for legitimation can be satisfied as it arises.'
8
The contradiction of the state, then, and the boundary of its auton-
omy, is that it cannot appear in the business of merely fostering private
accumulation of wealth if it is to be legitimated on its liberal demo-
cratic premise, and yet neither can it afford to alienate the forces of
private accumulation upon which it has become dependent for its
material sustenance.
Politics in this scheme is reduced to contests over distributive
issues, such as how high taxes should be or how long unemployment
insurance should be paid; it does not challenge the ownership of
property, the accumulation of capital and only rarely calls into ques-
tion the entitlement to publicly funded goods and services. The basic
17 J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973)
at 203.




power structure of the welfare state must be accepted as given.
Individuals confront the state, in other words, in a spirit of calculation,
as fragmented actors in a system of interest groups that, in the case of
the taxpayer, encourages certain facets of their life to be revealed to
the state and others to be concealed.19
Thus, the state can only facilitate accumulation if, and for as long
as, it maintains sufficient legitimacy in the population. In the case of
the welfare state, its legitimacy has historically hinged on the decom-
modification of the market. The rise of the welfare states in North
America and Western Europe were shaped by particular constellations
of class forces and thus vary on a number of significant points; they
all share, however, the incorporation of social rights into state inter-
vention in the market as a precondition for legitimacy. 20 As Esping-
Andersen explains:
the outstanding criterion for social rights must be the degree to which they
permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces.
It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens' status as commodities.
2 1
By decommodifying labour through, among other forms of state
intervention, income security, unemployment insurance, old-age pen-
sions, and regulated collective bargaining, the welfare state promised
the possibility of the amelioration of poverty and deprivation as well
as the integration of unions and labour groups into political institu-
tions, both of which were considered necessary in the aftermath of the
Second World War to ensure the stability and security of capitalist
growth.
Variations in welfare structures caused by the particular political
development of each state, Esping-Andersen argues, result in differing
levels of decommodification. 22 Canada (along with the United States)
is classified as a pure case of liberal hegemony in which labour has
for the most part been subservient to the demands of capital. On the
decommodification scale used by Esping-Andersen to compare the
eighteen welfare states he studies, only Australia, New Zealand and
the United States were held to have welfare systems which decom-
modified the market less than Canada. 23 What this indicates is the
extent to which the state in Canada has historically been implicated
in, and dependent on, the private accumulation of capital.
Claus Offe has pointed out that the welfare state has never been an
autonomous source of prosperity.24 In the 1970s, the formula of
economic intervention developed by advanced capitalist states began
to unravel. Rather than stimulate increased growth and redistribution
19 See A. Cairns, "The Past and Future ofthe Canadian Administrative State" (1990)
40 U.T.L.J. 319 at 359-60.
20 See G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1990). See also D. Ashford, The Emergence of the Welfare States
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
21 Esping-Andersen, ibid. at 3.
22 Ibid. at 1.
23 Ibid. at 50-4.
24 Quoted in ibid. at 57.
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through higher employment, government spending began instead to
fuel inflation, which in turn caused unemployment rates to rise, strikes
and labour unrest to proliferate, and a tight monetary policy to be
instituted to fight inflation. An unprecedented fiscal crisis arose as
governments slid into increasingly crippling debt. Public expenditures
began to be viewed as a burden to the production of wealth rather than
its prerequisite. It was in part due to this fiscal crisis, and to its
attendant legitimation and rationality crises, that the conservative
capitalist strategies of the New Right found such fertile soil in the
mid-1970s and early 1980s.
The New Right refers to a curious amalgam of fundamentalist
religious conservatism and individualist economic conservatism that
joined forces under the leadership of Ronald Reagan in the United
States and Margaret Thatcher in Britain (and is commonly contrasted
to the more elitist and more marginal "Old Right" that reached its apex
of influence during Barry Goldwater's 1964 bid for the U.S. presi-
dency).
25
With the rise to power of Brian Mulroney in 1984, this movement
began to exert considerable influence over the agenda of welfare state
reform in Canada.26 Drawing philosophical, economic and strategic
inspiration from postwar conservative scholars such as Sir Keith
Joseph, Frederich Hayek, Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman, and
Enoch Powell, the New Right advanced a comprehensive agenda to
roll back both the size and the mission of the state in market capitalism.
The role of the state was conceived as maintaining the framework
within which markets can freely operate, not to provide entitlements
to services in order to satisfy public wants. In other words, people
should satisfy their wants as private consumers of the market, not as
public clients of the welfare state.
The philosophy of the New Right was premised on the "trickle-
down" notion of prosperity and growth which claimed that if the
wealthiest stratum of society is offered the opportunity to enrich
themselves, they will invest their wealth in stimulating economic
growth. This in turn will provide more jobs, a higher standard of living
and result in overall prosperity. Specific conservative policy initiatives
concerned the deregulation of industry, privatization of state owned
or operated enterprises, supply-side incentives (through monetary
controls and tax cuts) as well as the trimming or eliminating of a host
of welfare expenditures characterized as luxuries that could no longer
be afforded. Combined with increased military spending (as in the case
25 See the discussion of this split in the conservative capitalist movement (the authors
eschew the term "New Right") in K. Hoover & R. Plant, Conservative Capitalism
in Britain and the United States: A Critical Appraisal (London: Routledge, 1989)
at 76-92. See also P. Marshak, The New Right and the Restructuring of Global
Markets (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991) at I11.
26 Its impact on Canadian political discourse, however, can be traced back con-
siderably farther; see S. Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in
the Canadian-American Relationship (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic
Policy, 1982).
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of the United States), and soaring debt-loads (as in the case of the U.S.
and Canada), these measures combined to fashion a period of consis-
tent growth in the United States, Britain, Canada and other advanced
capitalist countries between the recessions which marred the begin-
ning and the close of the 1980s.
27
One of the central and most resonant planks of the New Right has
been the need to utilize the tax system to encourage the accumulation
of wealth, provide an incentive for increased productivity and attract
domestic and international capital for investment. High marginal tax
rates are held to act as disincentives to business and individual invest-
ment, as a disproportionate share of the returns on investment are
taxed.28 People are thus encouraged to consume rather than risk their
wealth in the market, which in turn diminishes productivity and
increases inflation.
For the New Right, income taxation is viewed simply as a species
of legal theft. As one columnist advocating this perspective recently
analogized, shielding income from the tax collector is like taking off
your gold jewellery before embarking on an evening stroll in a
dangerous neighbourhood-a prudent and justifiable reaction to a
threatening world. 29 It is the payment of taxes that requires justifica-
tion to this school of thought, not the evasion of taxes.
Despite the widespread marketing of this perspective in Canada, it
has not succeeded in undermining the Canadian public's acceptance
of the welfare state's premise: the structural power arrangements that
produced the welfare state, it would appear, remain inviolable. Indeed,
the sweeping election victories of the NDP in Ontario, Saskatchewan
and British Columbia in the early 1990s would arguably not have been
possible had the neo-conservative critique of the welfare state been
completely embraced in the 1980s, although the growth of the Reform
Party over this same time period demonstrates the continuing presence
and influence of this critique of the welfare state in Canada. It is also
possible, however, that the concurrent rise of the Reform Party and
the electoral successes of the NDP are more a product of dissatisfac-
tion with the incumbent government than with any deeper sentiments
about the neo-conservative agenda. Nevertheless, it is apparent that,
rather than the project itself, it is the size and operation of the welfare
state that has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism. Keith
Banting offers the following account of the ambivalent and uniquely
27 See the figures published in IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1990), 130,
cited in A. Donner, "Recession, Recovery, and Redistribution: The Three R's of
Canadian State Macro-policy in the 1980s," in D. Drache & M. Gertler, eds., The
New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991) 26 at 28. Of the three states, Canada's
GDP grew at the highest rate, fluctuating between 3% and 6% from 1983 to 1989.
28 See G. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981) at 77. For a
Canadian perspective on the similar philosophy, see P. Malvem & G. Venderberg,
Fighting Back: Tax Evasion and the Great Canadian Tax Revolt (Toronto:
Methuen, 1984).
29 See K. Selick, "Let's Not Confuse Tax Evader with Unemployment Insurance
Cheater," Ontario Lawyer's Weekly (27 January, 1989) 16.
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Canadian reception of the conservative capitalist message in the
1980s:
Throughout the postwar era, the prevailing assumption was that a welfare state
would complement the market economy; it would be an instrument of counter-
cyclical stabilization, it would ensure an educated and healthy workforce; and
it would provide the complex social infrastructure essential to an urban
economy. While such ideas never commanded universal assent, thei rreign was
reasonably secure during the decades of sustained economic growth. The
problems of the past ten years, however, have revived older conceptions of
fundamental incompatibility between economic efficiency and social equity.
A resurgent conservative critique insists that the modem welfare state and its
associated taxes undermine growth by stifling entrepreneurship, distorting the
incentive structure, interfering with the operation of labour markets, and
reinforcing dependency among the recipient population. That is not to say that
Canada has entered a new era of unchallenged conservative ideological he-
gemony--there is vigorous resistance to any such shift within important
elements of the political system, and only a limited resonance in public attitudes
as a whole.... The basic legitimacy of the welfare state is not an issue for the
Canadian public.30
In my view, the aspect of the New Right's critique that has found
the deepest and most enduring appeal is its claim that Canadians are
over-taxed, despite reservations (discussed below) about the equity of
how the tax burden is shared. The emphasis on taxation in the public
relations war against the welfare state is not surprising, given the
central role of the income tax in the institutionalization of class
conflict. As O'Connor notes:
Every important change in the balance of class and political forces is registered
in the tax structure. Put another way, tax systems are simply particular forms
of class systems. ... Ruling classes normally attempt either to conceal or to
justify or to rationalize tax exploitation ideologically.
31
III. THE INCOME TAX: ENFORCEMENT, EXPENDITURES
AND EQUITY IN THE 1980S
In order to understand the changing dynamics of tax evasion in the
1980s, it is necessary not only to analyze the changing dynamics of
the welfare state and the forces which led to the rise of the New Right,
but also the character of Canada's tax system itself. In this section, I
argue that the distortions which preserve the contradictions of the
welfare state are reflected and reproduced in the structures of the tax
process.
Through a variety of statutory mechanisms, Canada's income tax
system explicitly allows and encourages the wealthy to prosper;32 it is
30 K. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 2d ed. (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987) at 185.
31 O'Connor, supra note 17 at 202-203.
32 For a recent survey of some of the most explicit ways in which the tax system
does this, see G. Bruce Doem, "Tax Expenditures and Tory Times," in K. Graham,
ed., How Ottawa Spends 1989-90: The Buck Stops Where? (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1989). See also N. Brooks, "The Changing Structure of the
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nevertheless widely presented to the public as punitive toward those
who are prosperous. The emphasis of the New Right and a source of
its success has been, as noted above, to portray the progressive income
tax as a barrier to increased investment in economic growth. This
perspective and its "trickle-down" acceptance throughout society, of
course, did not originate in the 1980s. In Louis Eisenstein's study
entitled The Ideologies of Taxation, published over thirty years ago,
33
two perceptions are identified as the central tenets of a conservative
approach to income tax: 1) that the income tax be tied to one's ability
to pay (and not to the redistribution of wealth); and 2) that one's tax
burden not act as a barrier or deterrent to investment. Eisenstein points
out that an argument for both these claims can be found in the classical
discourse of liberalism (for example, a redistributive income tax must,
by definition, discriminate against the prosperous, and therefore con-
tradicts a pure notion of equality in government interference).
34
Contrary to the empirical implications of the New Right's critique
of the income tax, there seems to be little historical or empirical
correlation between tax incentives and economic performance; in
other words, when progressive or high tax rates have been imposed,
or capital gains from investments taxed, or tax avoidance rigorously
deterred, or tax evasion vigorously prosecuted, business investment
usually perseveres, and indeed, often continues to be profitable; when
the reverse occurs, there are usually other more determinant factors
influencing investment and business conduct.
35
However, the ingenuity of Eisenstein's contribution to the study of
income taxation stems from the second tier of his argument, namely,
that favouring equality along the classical liberal model offers clear
advantages to those who happen to be wealthy already. In other words,
since the market creates inequality, any government regulation of the
market (which is what any income tax represents) that treats all
individuals as equal only reinforces and reproduces that inequality.
The history of income distribution in Canada bears out this assertion.
The wealthiest quintile of Canadians has accounted for between 41
and 43 per cent of total income earned annually in Canada throughout
the postwar era, while the poorest quintile has accounted for between
3.6 and 5 per cent of total income earned annually. 36 Despite the re-
Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the Rich," (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J.
(forthcoming).
33 Eisenstein, Ideologies of Taxation (New York: The Ronald Press, 1961).
34 See generally, M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
35 See L. McQuaig, Behind Closed Doors (Toronto: Viking, 1987) at 66. See also
F. Block, "Rethinking the Political Economy of the Welfare State," in F. Block
et al. eds., The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State (New York:
Pantheon, 1987) at 113-18.
36 See figures from Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size in Canada,
Canada Year Book, quoted in J.H. Perry, A Fiscal History of Canada The Postwar
Years, Canadian Tax Paper No. 85 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989),
Table 28.1, 752.
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distributive promise of a progressive income tax, 37 the operation of
this tax in Canada, along with the variety of regressive sales taxes and
property taxes that comprise Canada's "tax mix," has actually allowed
the rich to become enriched, and hindered the poor from escaping
poverty. Moreover, this has not happened accidentally, or as a result
of the neutral machinations of an invisible hand. Rather, in the concise
opinion of Linda McQuaig, "we don't have a progressive tax system
because the rich have indicated that they don't want one."
38
Given the realities of market capitalism in Canada, a neutral income
tax has never been an option; both the tax and the way in which it is
enforced either promotes inequality or redress. Neutrality in the dis-
course of income taxation, rather, refers to provisions that do not
privilege one kind of economic or social activity over another. The
goal of a neutral income tax is to tax people on the basis of the choices
they make (whether to devote their income to savings or consumption,
to real estate or retail, and so on), not to make the income tax itself the
basis for those choices (as in the proliferation of sham tax avoidance
transactions or the desirability of losing money in certain circum-
stances so as to shelter other gains). As a result of a tax policy system
embedded in interest-group pluralism and dependent on the vagaries
of the market, however, this neutrality has not been realized either.
The impact of the income tax on spending and saving habits, though,
should not obscure the more fundamental impact of the income tax on
the equity of the distribution of income in the welfare state. The impact
of the income tax on equity in Canada, as asserted in the following
passage by Neil Brooks, has been to entrench and extend the inequali-
ties produced by the market:
The overall tax system is viciously regressive: income from property bears a
much lighter tax burden than income from labour, many high-income taxpay-
ers and multinational corporations pay income tax at extremely low effective
rates and in some cases not at all; the government spends billions of dollars in
corporate tax expenditures and yet most have been shown to be ineffective and
to have an adverse impact on the economy; the income tax subsidizes the
lifestyles of the rich; and most personal tax expenditures benefit high income
taxpayers disproportionately more than low-income taxpayers.
39
It is beyond the scope of this study to detail all the various specific
deductions, exemptions, credits, rollovers and deferrals in the Act
which give effect to the above remarks. Some general remarks, how-
ever, may serve to elaborate on this claim. For example, the range of
37 Currently, the tax rate schedule is as follows: 17% on 28,275 or less; $4,807 +
26% on the next $28,275; and on any income above $56,550, $12,158 + 29% on
the remainder. Provincial tax rates are added as a percentage of the federal tax
rate; the highest of these rate is 62% in Newfoundland, while the lowest is 44%
in the Northwest Territories. Additionally, certain provinces impose a surtax for
example, Ontario levies a surtax of 10% of tax over $10,000.
38 Supra note 43 at xxvii.
39 N. Brooks, "Future Directions in Canadian Tax Law Scholarship," (1985) 23
Osgoode Hall LJ. 441 at 470-471. See also L. Sossin, "Squeezing Blood From




deductions open to a corporate or individual taxpayer earning income
from business or property are far broader than those available to an
ordinary taxpayer earning income from salary.40 These deductions
include office supplies, travelling expenses, moving expenses, legal
expenses, and interest on any debt incurred for the purposes of
realizing income, among a host of others. Most galling to many critics,
corporations and individuals earning income from business invest-
ments are even permitted to deduct expenses incurred in lobbying the
government for more deductions. Further, income earned from invest-
ments, such as the sale of stocks, companies, personal property or real
estate are taxed at a preferential rate (three-quarters) as capital gains,
rather than merely as all other forms of income. 41 Prior to 1972, capital
gains were not taxed at all. While those earning profits from business
and property suddenly found an increased proportion of the annual
income taxable, Canada's wealthy were more than compensated by
the simultaneous repeal of the inheritance, estate and gift taxes. This
allowed wealth to be transferred from one generation to another
without any effective recapture by the state, further thwarting what-
ever redistributive ambition Canada's tax system harboured. 42 Re-
viewing the implications and consequences of this tax reform, Neil
Brooks and Linda McQuaig recently wrote the following:
Most Canadian had never known about the tax anyway, since it only applied
to those with large wealth holdings ... But the lack of any public debate was
astonishing, since the revenue loss was enormous. Over the next twenty years
alone, it would save Canada's wealthy families well over $20 billion, by
conservative estimates ... the removal of the inheritance tax was, in the long
run, more significant than the imposition of the capital gains tax.
4 3
40 In the Act, section 18 sets out those exceptions to the general rule that all expenses
incurred in the earning of income from business or property are deductible, and
section 8 sets out those exceptions to the general rule that no deductions are
permitted for expenses incurred in the earning of income from office or
employment.
41 This practice is a holdover from the principle that all income must emanate from
a source, and it is the income, not the source, that is taxable, so that in the metaphor
of a farm (popularized in the early common law jurisprudence on taxation), the
fruit of the trees are taxable as income, but the trees themselves are not taxed at
all. Prior to the tax reform package of 1972, capital gains were not taxable income
at all in Canada. See B.J. Arnold et al, eds., Materials on Canadian Income Tax,
8th ed (Toronto: De Boo, 1989) at 573-656.
42 On the regressive effects of repealing these taxes, see J. Bossons, "Economic
Overview of the Tax Reform Legislation," Report of the Twenty-Third Tax
Conference, 1971 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1972), 45-67; J. Head,
"Canadian Tax Reform and Participatory Democracy," quoted in W.I. Gillespie,
Tax, Borrow & Spend: Financing Federal Spending in Canada, 1867-1990
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991) 206.
43 N. Brooks & L. McQuaig, "In Tories They Trust" (1992) 26:5 This Magazine 13.
The authors go on to point out that, in order to soften the blow of the capital gains
tax, wealthy families were permitted to place taxable income in trusts. The
Trudeau government enacted provisions that would defer the tax liability on these
trusts for 21 years. This period of grace ended January 1, 1993, and as a result of
intense lobbying by the high-income taxpayers and their representatives, the
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In addition to a lesser rate of taxation for capital gains, a generous
lifetime exemption of $100,000 in tax-free capital gains is also pro-
vided.44 Buildings, equipment and other capital investments may be
depreciated annually by businesses to offset income earned, despite
the likelihood that much of this property will appreciate in value over
time. The recapture of taxes on these profits takes place only when the
item is sold or transferred or when, in the case of an individual, the
taxpayer dies or establishes residency abroad. The effect of this
provision is to provide an enormous interest-free loan in the form of
a tax deferral to the taxpayers who can afford to invest surplus income.
Virtually all of the advantages given to taxpayers privilege corpo-
rations. Moreover, for the purposes of the income tax, corporations
are nominally treated as any other taxpayer earning income from
business, property and investments, 45 though corporations are subject
to a separate rate schedule. 46 Though corporations are recognized as
taxpayers conceptually indistinguishable from individuals, they pre-
sent the income tax system with some extraordinary dilemmas. For
example, many corporations both generate taxable income and distrib-
ute taxable stock dividends to shareholders and thus are notionally
"double-taxed" on these profits.
47
This is off-set, however, by the plethora of tax expenditures con-
tained in the Income Tax Act designed to provide corporations with
incentives to invest, subsidies to operate, and a low-risk environment
in which to accumulate wealth. In the postwar era of increasing state
regulation and modification of the market, the tax system has taken
on an increasingly interventionist role in the economic well-being of
the country. This has transformed the income tax from a means of
gathering revenue and redistributing income, to an engine of economic
development and a safety-net for capital investment. One of the most
vivid illustrations of the way in which the income tax has been
transformed is the rise in prominence of tax expenditures, that is,
tax-breaks for individuals and corporations pursuing certain desig-
nated economic or social activities. 48 These tax expenditures have
government has proposed a bill that would, further delay repayment and allow
for huge tax savings and deprive the public treasury of vast debts it has now been
owed a generation. Brooks and McQuaig express alarm over the virtual absence
of public awareness and debate over the implications of this proposed legislation.
44 Farmers and small business-persons are given a lifetime exemption of $500,000.
45 Among corporations, though, technical distinctions are made between private
corporations, Canadian-controlled private corporations, public corporations,
charitable corporations and so forth.
46 The combined federal and provincial corporate income tax rate has decreased
from 46% in 1972 to 38% after the conservatives tax reform package in 1988-
this rate is reduced to 22% forcorporations eligible fora small business deduction.
47 See D.P. Jones, "Corporations, Double Taxation and the Theory of Integration"
(1979) 27 Can. Tax. J. 405.
48 The Finance Department defines a tax expenditure as taking the form of
exemptions, deductions, credits, reduced tax rates and deferrals. Tax expenditures
provide special tax treatment to selected individuals and groups in society. While
the nature of these activities varies considerably, mining, oil exploration, small
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rapidly come to replace direct subsidies as a less visible and hence less
politically controversial means of furthering specific policy aims. By
the late 1970s, the growth of tax expenditures consistently outpaced
the growth of direct government subsidies.
49
The use of tax incentives to stimulate business investment intensi-
fied after the institution of the tax reform package in 1972 which made
capital gains taxable. These expenditures were first enacted on a wide
scale by the Trudeau government in 1976 in the face of increasing
budget restraint, a sagging investment climate, and the freedom from
the constraints that the previous minority government, aligned with
the NDP, had placed on the Liberals prior to 1974. In 1975, for
instance, a 5 per cent investment tax credit was employed on capital
expenditures; it was initially intended to last through the recession of
the mid-1970s but was later extended.50 Governments from both
parties found these incentives more politically expedient than direct
subsidies; however, they also proved less efficient at accomplishing
their stated objectives and, resulted in tax officials administering
policy initiatives for which they are both untrained and unsuited. The
growth of tax expenditures was curtailed somewhat by a brief period
in the late 1970s during which a list of lost revenues due to these
expenditures was calculated and published. This controversial prac-
tice was quickly stopped. By 1980, there were 200 tax expenditures
built into the Act; this figure had ballooned to 300 by 1985. By 1983,
the government was estimated by Revenue Canada to be losing, or
rather the Finance Department investing in the economy, approxi-
mately $23 billion annually through tax expenditures. 5' Donald Sa-
voie, in his study The Politics of Public Spending in Canada attributes
Canada's staggering $300 billion national deficit in large part to the
federal government's "failure to tax".52 Despite measures such as the
child tax credit or tuition tax credit and a host of expenditures made
business ventures, and farming are some examples of prominent areas of
expenditures in the Act. For the first public accounting of these expenditures and
their cost to the taxpayers, see Department of Finance, Government of Canada
Tax Expenditures Account (Ottawa: The Department, 1979); for commenton this
inaugural report, see N. LePan, "Measurement of the Revenue and Distributive
Effects of Tax Expenditures" Canadian Taxation 2 (1980), 220; Brooks, supra
note 39 at 465-8; for recent developments, see Doem, "Tax Expenditures and
Tory Times"; see generally S. Surrey and P. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
49 See E. Tamagno, "Comparing Direct Spending and Tax Spending" (1979) 1
Canadian Taxation 42 at 44.
50 For a complete listof the early expenditures incorporated in theAct, see F. Harman
& J. Johnson, "An Examination of Government Tax Incentives for Business
Investment in Canada" (1978) 26 Can. Tax J. 691; see also R.M. Bird, Tax
Incentives for Investment: The State of the Art, Canadian Tax Paper No. 64
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980).
51 This figure is cited by D. Savoie, The Politics of Public Spending in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 332. An audit of tax expenditures
for the year 1982-3 estimated this figure to be $28 billion; see Report of the
Auditor General, 1986 (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1986), 4:17.
52 Ibid. at 329.
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on behalf of farmers, the recipients of tax expenditures tend to be
corporations with capital to invest and reserves of income to shelter.
Indeed, while the share of income tax revenue contributed by corpo-
rations was roughly equal to that of individuals in the initial postwar
years; by 1989, individuals contributed 7.4 times the share of taxes as
compared to corporations. Personal taxes increased close to 15 per
cent during the 1980s, while the corporate tax burden was reduced by
close to 35 per cent, leaving Canadian corporations at the close of the
decade with an unusually light burden of income taxation relative to
other advanced industrial countries.
53
The effect of these measures aimed at allowing corporations to
generate more profits, however, is to undermine any moral or eco-
nomic rationale for deterring illegitimate tax avoidance or for punish-
ing tax evasion. According to the report on Revenue Canada
commissioned by the Liberal government shortly before its departure
in 1984, "[m]uch tax reduction or avoidance is not only sanctioned by
government policy, by law or by administrative practice, but is actu-
ally encouraged through various forms of tax incentives. ' '54 The
Auditor General estimated that by 1982, a pool of losses through
unused tax credits offered to corporations had reached $18.5 billion. 55
As these corporations attempt to convert these unused credits into
cash, the Finance Department is compelled to deter their efforts, thus
adding further complexity to the Act, and further incentives for cor-
porations to invest in tax planning. The Auditor General concluded:
It is virtually impossible to eliminate taxpayer induced avoidance mechanisms.
The legislative drafters and their advisers do not have the resources or the
incentives of the private sector experts who devise them.... These avoidance
mechanisms also have a negative effect on the equity and integrity of the tax
system and on the attitudes to voluntary compliance. Access to such mecha-
nisms is usually restricted to those who can afford very expensive advice.
Those who cannot may therefore be denied equitable and even-handed treat-
ment.
56
The example of tax expenditures reveals how Canada's tax legisla-
tion privileges certain sectors of the economy and segments of the
population in relation to the rest. The income tax system has been a
favoured vehicle for successive Canadian governments to placate the
policy preferences of special interest groups; the result, not surpris-
ingly, has been an income tax skewed to benefit groups which were
able to bring to the policy process resources, influence and hence
access.
The pathologies of Canada's tax system, however, include more
than merely the many tax advantages to the wealthy incorporated into
the Income Tax Act. As the Auditor General alluded to above, the
self-assessment nature of the income tax allows those with sufficient
53 For an elaboration on these figures from Statistics Canada and the OECD, see M.
Hurtig, The Betrayal of Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991) at 146-57.
54 Farlinger, supra note 1 at 17:22.
55 Report of the Auditor General, 1986,4:32.
56 Ibid. at 4:34.
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means the freedom to employ tax planners (generally, lawyers and
accountants) to ensure that their tax burden is avoided to the maximum
extent allowable "by law". This feature of Canada's tax system has
given rise to vast amounts of time and effort deployed in seeking new
and ever more sophisticated means of tax minimization on behalf of
the high-income taxpayer population.
For the wealthier taxpayers, the value of the investment in tax
planning and in executing tax avoidance transactions easily outpaces
the expense. For the middle and low-income salaried taxpayers,
however, the income tax is not a luxury they can afford to do without.
Harvey Perry, one of the former members of Canada's Royal Com-
mission on Taxation, observed recently that corporations have become
equally concerned with a tax dollar saved as with a dollar of profit
earned. 57 It occupies much corporate energy, and preoccupies a sig-
nificant proportion of this country's professional labour. Vern Krishna
goes further, contending, "tax avoidance often provides as much of an
impetus towards the global economy as any other single direct eco-
nomic stimulus. '58 Avoidance, of course, can either be achieved
legislatively (for instance, by permitting tax avoidance transactions),
judicially (for instance, by narrowly interpreting the powers of the
Revenue Department to investigate avoidance) and administratively
(for instance, by budgetary cutbacks to auditing or by self-imposed
restraint in enforcement on the part of Revenue Canada). In Canada,
all three methods have been successfully employed, which has re-
sulted in tax avoidance becoming a boom industry in the 1980s.
Consider the following figures on the rates of audits undertaken by
Revenue Canada:
Table 1.1: Enforcement Coverage as a Percentage of Tax Returns
5 9
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
Individuals 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Corporations 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5
Over seven hundred fewer corporations were audited in 1989 than
in 1984 when the Progressive Conservatives took office.60 This is all
the more significant given that the number of corporate income tax
returns rose from approximately 500,000 in 1980 to 900,000 in 1989.61
57 See J.Harvey Perry, A Fiscal History of Canada-The Postwar Years, Canadian
Tax Paper No. 85 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) at 337.
58 V. Krishna, The Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tar, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1989) at 850.
59 Ibid., exhibit 24.3 at 560. I have rounded the figures for simplicity. Despite this
decline, $952 million in additional revenue was assessed through audits in
1989/90. See Report of the Auditor General, 1990 (Ottawa: Supply and Services,
1990) at 553-5.
60 Ibid. at 562.
61 Revenue Canada, Taxation 1990-91 Estimates: Part III, figures 6 and 7.
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Additionally, 45 per cent of Revenue Canada's audits target taxpayers
who report income in excess of $3 million.
Despite this decline in auditing coverage, a greater proportion of
audits are currently directed towards corporations than previously; this
is largely because audits of corporations have historically yielded far
greater amounts of additional tax assessed (nearly double the amount
in 1988, for instance) and thus this shift offsets the decreasing budg-
etary allotments to auditing overall. 62 For example, in 1984 approxi-
mately 467 million dollars in additional taxes were assessed overall
compared to 952 million dollars in 1989.63 Whereas the average audit
of an individual's tax return resulted in an average of $6,382 in
additional tax assessed, the average audit of a corporation netted
$41,004 additional tax revenue.64 It is worthwhile emphasizing that
this sort of routine underreporting is not treated as tax evasion or even
as tax avoidance; indeed, once such practices are uncovered, they
attract no legal consequences beyond the added liability to the tax-
payer.
Approximately 10,000 tax practitioners are arrayed against Reve-
nue Canada's enforcement apparatus. 65 While these professionals
range in talent, expertise and expense, they share the same fundamen-
tal purpose; virtually all seek to minimize the tax burden of their
clients. Tax lawyers are said to owe a duty not only to their client but
also to the "system" as a whole.66 While it is difficult to discern this
facet of the tax community's role, it is clear that tax practitioners have
an influential impact on the public's consciousness of the tax system.
What is actually in the interest of the corporate and high-income
taxpayers who comprise the bulk of the tax community's clientele
(such as more restrained tax enforcement and less restrained protec-
tion of taxpayer's rights), becomes universalized by these advocates
to be in the interests of overall fairness and prosperity. Tax adminis-
trators, notionally entrusted with ensuring the equity of the income
tax, and with whom the majority taxpayers have no contact save for a
refund cheque, are painted by large segments of this community as
autocrats to be feared and mistrusted.67 Linda McQuaig offers a vivid
depiction of this characterization:
The bad guy in the game is always some faceless bureaucrat at Revenue Canada
whose powers seem unlimited. He can probe relentlessly into the client's most
intimate financial details, demand endless documentation, reject expenses that
may seem perfectly justifiable. His decision can be appealed to the courts but
that is such a tiring, expensive, unpredictable, route and it leaves the taxpayer
once again in the hands of an austere, outside authority. It's not surprising that
the tax practitioner comes to see his clients as victims and quickly sheds any
62 Report of the Auditor General, 1990, supra note 59 at 563.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. at 575.
65 McQuaig, supra note 35 at 118.
66 See B. Wolfman & J. Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice, 2d ed.
(Charlottesville, Va: The Michie Company, 1985) at 1.
67 For a brief overview of the negative publicity Revenue Canada endured in the
1980s, see supra note 39 at 181-86.
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moral qualms about doing everything possible to protect them from the heavy,
omnipotent hand of the state.
68
It is not merely the intimate involvement of the tax community in
the tax process that ought to be critically scrutinized but the exclusivity
of that community's involvement. This community has evolved from
reacting to tax reform to shaping it. Since the demise of the MacEachen
reform package of 1981, in which the tax practitioner community was
not significantly consulted and subsequently lobbied successfully to
scrap the reform legislation, the pattern that has traditionally charac-
terized tax reform in Canada seems to be changing. 69 Tax reform now
seems to be driven by technical and revenue generating concerns (or,
in short, the concerns of the tax community and their high-income
clientele); any notion that income taxation and social justice necessar-
ily intermingle has, to a significant extent, been ignored. As James
Gilles remarked on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the
Carter Commission Report:
In 1987, the situation is quite different: the political support for reform is not
a consequence of any comprehensive analysis of equity, justice or anything
else. Rather, it is based on a widely shared, uncomplicated view that tax laws
are too complex and need to be simplified.... There is some belief that the
system contains inequities and that it is not entirely fair, but most politicians
know that equity is not a major vote-tuming issue.70
The focus on simplification, however, misses the point that equita-
ble compliance is the heart of the issue, not the grammatical structure
of the Act. Robert Couzin states, "a tax measure may generally be said
to enhance tax simplification if it facilitates compliance."'7' This leads
to a circular argument, as it is in many ways precisely the widespread
incidence of avoidance and evasion that makes the technical complex-
ity and specificity of the Act necessary in the first place.72 The
increasing technical specificity of the Act has, additionally, led to the
acceptance of the principle that everything that is not expressly pro-
hibited under the Act, is permitted by law. Arguably, then, the popu-
larity of the simplification movement in tax reform masks what is
actually at stake in the reform debate, namely, the fairness, legitimacy
and justice of the tax system. The goal in exposing the distortions
manifest in the tax system is to reveal that taxation is, in the final
analysis, invariably a form of (if not a forum for) politics, and therefore
potentially, a site of social transformation.
Tapping the reservoir of discontent with the present tax system can
thus lead to political solutions to the problem of social and economic
inequality. The discontent, to be sure, does exist. For example, in a
68 Supra note 35 at 116.
69 See W.I. Gillespie, "Tax Reform: The Battlefield, The Strategies, The Spoils"
(1983) 26 Canadian Public Administration, 182-202.
70 Supra note 116 at 346.
71 R. Couzin, "Simplification and Reform" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.. 433 at 435.
72 See ibid. at 442. Couzin argues, "The correlation between complexity in the
income tax law and its administration and the effort to manage, if not eliminate
tax avoidance or abuse is undoubtedly high."
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preliminary study on taxpayer attitudes in Canada conducted by Neil
Brooks and Anthony Doob, over 90 per cent of the questioned Cana-
dian taxpayers shared a belief that people are able to avoid paying their
fair share of the tax burden by hiring experts to find loopholes for
them; in the same survey, over 80 per cent expressed the opinion that
corporations and businesses are taxed too little. 73 The majority said
that taxing capital gains at preferential rates was unfair. The study also
revealed that the overwhelming majority of Canadians expressed the
belief that they are overtaxed.74 Finally, in a general representation of
disenchantment with the tax system, over half of the surveyed group
in that study thought that the tax system, overall, was unfair.75 Alan
Cairns notes in his study of the response to the malaise of Canada's
welfare state, "exit is a blunt response widely employed by both capital
and citizens. '76 What Cairns does not explore is the difference in the
nature and implications of the response depending on whether it is
capital or citizens that are exiting, and further, depending on whose
capital and which citizens are exiting.
IV. TAX EVASION AND WELFARE STATE CRIME IN THE
1980s
Tax evasion is a species of fraud. 77 However, as I have endeavoured
to show, it is better understood as a product of, rather than a threat to,
the income tax system in Canada. As one Revenue Canada official has
cautioned, "any attempt by government to create equity in taxation
will be ineffective if evasion is not brought under control. '78 The study
by Brooks and Doob on the incidence of tax evasion in Ontario
revealed what many familiar with tax culture in Canada have sus-
pected for years, namely, that tax evasion is widespread. 79
73 N. Brooks & A. Doob, Making TaApayer Compliance Easier: Preliminary
Findings of a Canadian Survey, Paper prepared for the Internal Revenue Service
(U.S.) conference on taxpayer behaviour in November of 1990, 5.
74 The figure Brooks & Doob, ibid., cite is 80%, while 39% indicated that they would
prefer fewer government services in return for lower tax rates. Only 9% indicated
a preference for higher tax rates in return for better quality government services.
See Brooks & Doob, Making Tax Compliance Easier, 3; An American survey
yielded similar results, see Yankelvitch, Skelly and White Inc., "Taxpayer
Attitudes Study" (1984) quoted in E. Bardach, "Moral Suasion and Taxpayer
Compliance" (1989) 11 Law & Policy, 52; see also Y. Song & T. Yarborough,
"Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey" (1978) 38 Public Administration
Rev. at 442-52.
75 Brooks & Doob, ibid.
76 Supra note 19 at 354.
77 A senior Revenue Canada official elaborated on this, stating, "tax evasion is a
fraud on all Canadian taxpayers." See G. McCracken, "Preventing Tax Evasion
through Enforcement: The Government Perspective" in Income Tax Enforcement,
Compliance, and Administration, Corporate Management Tax Conference,
1988, Toronto (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) at 2:10.
78 Ibid. at 2:1.
79 Supra, note 73, in which 18.5% of the respondents to the survey were classified
as tax evaders. See also the rather sensationalist account of this modest research
project in the Globe & Mail (19 February 1991) Al.
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It is estimated that between 5 and 20 billion dollars are lost to tax
evasion annually.80 Unlike the United States, where tax evasion occu-
pies a high profile in the national psyche, 81 tax evasion generates very
little publicity in Canada. Like other forms of corporate or "white
collar crime," tax evasion is regarded as more a violation of an
administrative regulation than a breach of the social contract; it is a
practice to be discouraged but not to be punished. 82 As Harry Glasbeek
notes with respect to the difference between the killing of a person by
a person (to which the Criminal Code applies) and by a corporation
(to which an administrative statute governs), "the only thing which
differentiates them is the unseen factor: the purposes to which they
aim."'83 The purpose of the criminal law is to govern social relations,
while the purpose of the administrative regulatory statutes is to govern
market relations. This distinction, however, is rarely tenable. The
statement of the court with respect to sentencing for tax evasion in the
case of R. v. Horowitz84 is illustrative of this conundrum:
1, frankly, am not interested in the question of penalty as a punishment as such
... Probably the most important principle is in relation to the deterrence of
others. Perhaps the reason there is some confusion, in the mind of the public,
as to whether this is a truly criminal offence--such as an offence under the
Highway Traffic Act and other types of offences against statutory enact-
ments ... arises from some feeling, in certain quarters at least, that any imposi-
tion of taxes by a government is so unpopular that any infraction of the law is
an infraction against some vague and faceless entity and that such an offence
is different from others. ... I think it is important that the public realize that
such evasion is a criminal offence and that punishment is-and when I speak
of punishment I mean penalization not retribution-bound to follow.
The difference between penalization and retribution is important:
people are penalized for merely breaking the rules; retribution, how-
80 S. Berger, 'The Unrecorded Economy--Concepts, Approaches, and Preliminary
Estimates for Canada" in Statistics Canada, Can. Statistical Rev., monthly cata-
logue no. 11 -003E, cited in McCracken, "Preventing Tax Evasion." See also N.
Brooks & A. Doob, "Tax Evasion: Searching for a Theory of Compliance
Behaviour" in M. Friedland, ed., Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 122.
81 See D. Bumham, A Law Unto Itself: Power, Politics and the IRS (New York:
Random House, 1989) at 70-91. Interestingly, the IRS has broken down tax
evasion by sources and estimates (on the basis of 1982 figures) that out of
approximately 97 billion dollars of taxable revenue lost to the underground
economy, 66 billion resulted from unreported income earned by individuals, 12
billion resulted from overstated expenses, deductions, and tax credits, 5 billion
resulted from non-filing, 4 billion resulted from non-compliance by corporations,
and finally, 10 billion resulted from unreported income from illegal transactions.
These figures are cited by Brooks and Doob, "Tax Evasion," ibid. at 123.
82 See C. Tolefson, "Ideologies Clashing: Liberalism, Criminal Law and the
Regulatory Offence" (1992) 30 Osgoode HallL.J. (forthcoming); see also C. Goff
& C. Reasons, Corporate Crime in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1978);
and H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as Crimes: The Need
to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 393.
83 Glasbeek, ibid. at 412-3.
84 (1971), 25 D.T.C. 5350 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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ever, is reserved for people who infringe social values of collective
importance. The question of the criminality of income tax offences
was settled, though not necessarily resolved, by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd.85 Unlike offences
under the then Combines Investigation Act which were held to be
quasi-criminal, the Income Tax Act was deemed "essentially a regu-
latory statute since it controls the manner in which income tax is
calculated and collected. '86 The purpose of the offences set out in the
Act was characterized as to further compliance, not to penalize crimi-
nal conduct.87 The effect of this characterization, however, has wide
implications. Wilson, writing for the majority in McKinlay, found that
since the statute was regulatory and not criminal, the privacy interest
protected for those suspected of having committed an offence under
the Income Tax Act is less than were it criminal legislation. The search
and seizure provisions which were being challenged in the case were
thus upheld. 88 The following arguments of Young and Reid were cited
with approval in this regard:
There is, therefore, a large circle of social values and business activity in which
there is a very low expectation of privacy. The issue is not whether but rather
when, how much, and under what conditions information must be disclosed to
satisfy the state's legitimate requirements. Every person who fills an annual
tax return may be said to enjoy a low expectation of privacy with respect to
information about his income.89
More recently, the Supreme Court seems to be veering away from
rigid classifications of what is "criminal" and what is "regulatory," as
evidenced by the recent decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group
Inc.90 In that decision, La Forest J. noted (at 209), "what is ultimately
important are not labels (though these are undoubtedly useful), but the
values at stake in the particular context." Labels not only continue, to
some extent, to shape the boundaries of legal rights, they also define
what it means to contravene the law.
Not surprisingly, given the judicial pronouncements noted above,
people convicted under the provisions of the Income Tax Act are much
less likely to face incarceration than those convicted of other types of
fraud under the Criminal Code.91 Even more telling, and less explica-
ble according to the dichotomy between criminal and regulatory
85 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627.
86 Ibid. at 641.
87 For a case exploring this distinction in more detail, see R. v. Grinzwood, [1987]
2 S.C.R. 755.
88 See more recently however, Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J., No. 22298 (21
January 1993), striking down the search and seizure provision under s.231.3 as
infringing s.8 of the Charter.
89 A. Reid & A. Young, "Administrative Search and Seizure Under the Charter"
(1985) 10 Queen's L.J. 392 at 399-400.
90 [199113 S.C.R. 154. See also Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of
Invesitgation and Research), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425; and Kourtessis v. M.N.R.
(1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 201 (B.C.C.A.), [ 19931 S.C.J., judgment released April
22,1993.
91 See K. Dye, Report of the Auditor General, Canada (Ottawa: Supply and
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offences, defrauding the tax system attracts little of the derision
reserved for those individuals who defraud the welfare system.
92
Though prosecutions and convictions for tax evasion have histori-
cally been rare, perhaps reflecting a symbolic more than substantive
approach to enforcement, they declined significantly during the 1980s,





Prosecutions by Penalties and Jail
Total Cases Dept. of Justice Fines ($000) Terms
1984-85 539 163 9,044 2
1985-86 501 148 11,313 6
1986-87 561 130 8,285 4
1987-88 468 123 8,373 4
1988-89 459 103 12,471 4
Another enforcement practice that purposefully dwindled during
the 1980s is the publicizing of tax evasion proceedings, thus under-
mining any deterrent value such prosecutions might otherwise have
had. As the Auditor General explains:
Prosecutions of tax evaders are carried out primarily to deter others from
similarly breaching the tax laws. Deterrence requires publicity. Until recently
the Department actively promoted, within the constraints imposed by law,
publicity for its prosecutions through such means as news releases and periodic
notices to various professional organizations ... In 1987, however, the Depart-
ment adopted a policy of not initiating contacts with the media on specific
prosecutions.
94
Thus, while all but one prosecution for tax evasion received some
media attention in 1981, nearly half the prosecutions in 1988 received
no coverage at all.
The decision to bring a prosecution for tax evasion is made at the
discretion of the Justice Department on the recommendation of the
Department of National Revenue, Taxation. 95 Most routine charges of
Services, 1990). The Auditor General adds, "We are not suggesting that the
penalties for tax evasion are inappropriate when compared to other types of fraud.
That is a value judgment that Parliament, the government and the public must
make. The point of this illustration, and of our comments on the decline in
enforcement coverage and publicity for prosecution of tax evaders, is to show the
values that shape tax administration." See also for a discussion of fiscal crimes
and sentencing generally, Canadian Sentencing Digest, Quantum Service
(Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 219.
92 See R. Hasson, "Tax Evasion and Social Security Abuse-Some Tentative Obser-
vations" (1980) 2 Canadian Taxation 98 at 106.
93 Revenue Canada, Taxation Estimates, Part III at 46.
94 Ibid. at 560.
95 See Report of the Auditor General at 561.
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tax evasion are pursued as summary offences.96 It is the policy of the
department not to recommend prosecutions for tax evasion under
$100,000, unless other aggravating factors are involved, despite the
fact that under the Criminal Code, fraud over $1,000 is considered an
indictable offence.97 While such prosecutions carry the potential of a
maximum ten-yearjail sentence, the average duration of convicted tax
evaders is approximately ten months. 98
Despite the evidence which suggests that tax evasion is not taken
very seriously in Canada, and the consistently decreasing budgetary
allocations to audits and enforcement generally, this does not seem to
be the determining factor in motivating tax evasion. Brooks and Doob
report that economic, sociological and psychological theories of re-
ward and punishment are of limited explanatory value in the sphere
of tax compliance; rather, they conclude, "to explain taxpayer com-
pliance we would appear to need a model based on more complex and
subtle principles of human behaviour."99 The multiplicity of justifica-
tions for evading taxes also explains why much of the literature
exploring the implications of tax evasion is so tentative, though most
commentators seem to agree that tax evaders perceive little social cost
in their activities.'l° However, the fact that tax evasion entails little
social stigma or cost requires explanation. Were the consensus in our
society to coddle those individuals and corporations who seek to shield
their profits from the taxation, one would hardly expect to find
stringent and comprehensive sanctions in the Income Tax Act itself.
Yet, the range of penalties and the powers of enforcement at the tax
administrator's disposal are wide-ranging and far-reaching. 0 1 One
way of reconciling this discrepancy is by accepting that the welfare
state has an interest both in condemning tax evasion and in condoning
96 Revenue Canada, Taxation Operation Manual, Special Investigations, 1117.3
(1989).
97 These other factors may include the fact that the taxpayer is a repeat offender,
that there has been tampering of evidence or intimidation of witnesses, or that
there is evidence that the offender has been counselling others on the practice of
tax evasion. See ibid., 1117.2 (1990).
98 Supra note 95.
99 Supra note 80 at 157. For example, in response to the question "What is the most
important reason why people cheat on their income tax?", the following answers
were recorded: To beat the system or win out (13%); They think they can get
away with it (30%); They think everyone does it (13%); They think the tax system
is unfair (33%); and They do not like how the government spends their
money(10%).
100 See for example, Brooks & Doob, supra note 80; C. Boyd, "The Enforcement of
Tax Compliance: Some Theoretical Issues" (1986) 34 Can. TaxJ., 588; M. Spicer,
"Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion" (1986) 39 National
Tax J., 13; M. Spicer & L. Becker, "Fiscal Inequality and Tax Evasion: An
Experimental Approach" (1980) 33 National Tax J. 171; and A. Witte & D.
Woodbury, "The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance:
The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax," (1985) 38 National TaxJ. 1.
101 E. Greenspan, "Tax Evasion is a Crime!" (1988) Income Tax Enforcement,
Compliance and Administration, Corporate Management Tax Conference 1988,
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it, just as it must simultaneously intervene in the economy to com-
modify and decommodify social relations. In other words, one of the
effects of institutionalizing class conflict is to make income taxation
mandatory for low-income taxpayers and optional for high-income
taxpayers.
While the incidence of tax evasion is not class or income specific,
the phenomenon of tax evasion does reflect the inequities of the
Canadian tax system as well as the imbalances of its administration
and enforcement. While not all tax evasion is sophisticated (that is,
people such as waiters and taxi drivers who conduct a high proportion
of cash transactions may regularly engage in tax evasion), cases of tax
evasion involving large sums of money generally are.1°2 Although tax
evasion is not more prevalent in one socioeconomic stratum, the
damage it causes to the overall equity of the tax system increases
proportionally to the amount of taxes lost and the wealth of those being
enriched by them. As Doob alleged upon publication of the taxpayer
survey he co-authored, "it is really the rich who are cheating. ... It
appears that if people have an opportunity to cheat, they'll do so."1103
What Doob implies is not that the rich are more or less honest but that
the tax system provides the rich the opportunity to avoid and evade
taxes that is denied to the middle and low income taxpayers.
The amount of money involved in this illegal transfer of income
from the government to whom it is due, to the taxpayers with no legal
claim to keep it, is indeed staggering. What has commonly been
referred to as the "tax gap" represents the amount of money lost to
Revenue Canada through the unreported economy each year, that is,
the amount of money which would be taxable if the Income Tax Act
were universally and perfectly enforced. Unlike the Internal Revenue
Service in the United States which conducts large-scale, comprehen-
sive surveys on its underground economy, little is known about this
area in Canada. Recent government estimates put the "tax gap"
currently at approximately 20 billion dollars annually.1
04
The Auditor General of Canada estimates that $1.2 billion in
potential tax revenue is forfeited every year.'° Other studies basing
their figures on rough estimates suggest that up to 8 per cent of
Canada's GDP consists of unreported economic activity, resulting in
an annual loss of up to 12 per cent of tax revenues collected.1
0 6
Tax evasion, I have contended, is the natural consequence of a
system of taxation legitimated on the basis that people pay taxes
because governments have the right and the power to levy them, rather
than on the basis that taxes are sociallyjust. Tax evasion becomes more
102 See McCracken, supra note 77 at 2:3.
103 See the interview with Anthony Doob & Neil Brooks about their report in The
Toronto Star (29 January 1989) A!.
104 McCracken, supra note 77 at 2:1.
105 Report of the Auditor General, 1990, supra note 59 at 555.
106 See M. Ethier, "The Underground Economy: A Review of Economic Literature
and New Estimates for Canada," in F. Vaillancourt, ed., Income Distribution and
Economic Security in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 77.
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prevalent, in short, as the tax process becomes less connected to shared
convictions about equity and justice. As a representative judicial
pronouncement on tax evasion states, "nobody owes any public duty
to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced extractions, not
voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is
mere cant." °7 Thus, in order to grapple with the phenomenon of tax
evasion, one must first understand why citizens should choose to
voluntarily pay their taxes in the first place.
0 8
Eugene Bardach, in a recent article entitled, "Moral Suasion and
Taxpayer Compliance," explores what he contends to be the inade-
quacy of the four conventional rationales for paying one's taxes. 0 9 In
his view, these rationales are: 1) since people benefit from government
services, they should pay for them; 2) lawfulness and law-abidingness
are useful things, and so tax laws should be obeyed; 3) voluntarism is
a useful social principle, so cooperation with the government should
be voluntary; and 4) it affirms communal commitment to democracy
to cooperate in paying taxes.' "0
Bardach argues for a moral justification for paying taxes premised
on the principle of reciprocity, interpersonal equity, and fairness,
emphasizing that tax evasion is not a victimless crime. Put simply:
when a taxpayer evades or illegitimately avoids taxes, others must bear
a disproportionate share of the assigned tax burden. Thus, both more
aggressive enforcement by the state, and more pressure among tax-
payers on potential evaders, would be premised on the protection of
other citizens who bear their just share of the tax burden. In short, no
one deserves a free ride. The weakness of this formulation, however,
is precisely what Bardach takes to be its strength, namely, that it does
not legitimate state intrusion into the realm of the taxpayer's liberty,
but instead appeals to the notion of equity embedded in the foundations
of the liberal democratic society. Bardach adds, "Once government
comes to be seen as the necessary evil that it is, it is but a short step to
see the evil in being forced to pay your own taxes while your neighbour
manages to escape paying his."" I
The moral justification that strikes me as both more tenable, and
more in line with the search for a "crime prevention" approach to
deterring tax evasion, is that the state is not "a necessary evil" but,
potentially, the regulator of social justice. The income tax, on this
view, is not a burden (or not merely a burden), but ideally a consensual
agreement between citizens as to the appropriate relationship of
intervention and interdependence between the state and market. The
income tax can become a vehicle both for the equitable raising of
revenue, and for social transformation aimed at reversing the depoli-
107 C.I.R. v. Newman, 159 Fed 2d. 848 at 851 (1947), quoted in Krishna, supra note
58 at 834.
108 See M. Allingham & A. Sardno, "Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis"
(1972) 1 J. Public Economics 323.
109 E. Bardach, supra note 74 at 49.
110 Ibid. at 61.
I Ibid. at 64.
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ticization of the public sphere of the welfare state.'12 Corporations,
though, do not fit easily into this vision of a community of needs and
resources. Neither moral suasion nor social transformation can have
any meaningful impact on artificial persons and mere legal constructs.
Given this socially focused goal, the only feasible way in which to
treat corporations would seem to be to "unveil" them and reveal the
officers, directors and shareholders that either guide their actions or
benefit from them. While it may be more sensible to determine the
"ruling will" behind a corporate entity than to ascribe to that entity a
fictional, self-generating will of its own, 13 for the purposes of the
income tax, corporations are treated as independent of their constituent
components.
However, there is a more practical and complementary option with
far more profound consequences for corporate deviance that I would
advocate in response to tax evasion. Corporations convicted of tax
evasion ought to be subject to the tax owed, set fines and a probation-
ary order. The probationary order, as with individuals, would put the
corporation under state surveillance for a specified period of time:
business records would have to be periodically disclosed, transactions
reported, restructuring made subject to government approval, and of
course, tax returns scrupulously scrutinized. The logic behind this
form of punishment is that it recognizes that the fundamental goal of
criminal law is to regulate human freedom through knowledge. As
Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish, state authority is exercised
over individuals by requiring them to submit to increasingly dense and
cross-fertilized networks of surveillance and examination. 14 Perhaps,
it is more properly understood in reverse terms. As Kathy Ferguson
observes, "service bureaucracies give rise to knowledge about clients
through their power over them." ' 15 Tax evasion, on this view, demon-
strates the extent to which privileged individuals and corporations
have been permitted to exist outside the ambit of the welfare state
apparatus.
In the case of corporations and high-income individual taxpayers,
what is being withheld from the state is not merely revenue but also
knowledge and information. Both from the policy perspective of
individual and general deterrence, strictly supervised individual or
corporate probation seems an effective means of both reversing and
redressing tax evasion. As noted above, only a select group of indi-
vidual and corporate taxpayers are given the freedom to choose for
themselves what information to provide the state about their economic
112 1 pursue this argument and its implications for a more democratized form of tax
administration in L. Sossin, Revenue, Ideology and Legitimacy: The Politics of
Tax Administration in Canada (Toronto: Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Toronto, 1993) at 300-316.
113 See R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 (Alta. S.C.A.D.).
114 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of thePrison (New York: Vintage,
1979) at 176-7.
115 K. Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1984) at 136.
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activities. The penalty for choosing not to provide the required infor-
mation ought to be the retraction of this liberty.
As discussed above with relation to search and seizure provisions,
the Supreme Court has already affirmed that business records gener-
ally are to be accorded less privacy protection than personal records,
and that records relevant for income tax investigations in turn warrant
less protection than other business documents. Given the invasive
powers entrusted to tax administrators to enforce the Act, and the
social value in attaining increased surveillance over corporations and
high-income taxpayers generally, it would seem incongruous to main-
tain that subsequent to a tax evasion conviction, the privacy of a tax-
payer, especially a corporate one, ought to outweigh the interests of
the state in individual punishment and general deterrence.
One of the main drawbacks of a probationary sentence for individu-
als or corporations is that capital is becoming increasingly fungible;
it can be shifted relatively easily between jurisdictions, whereas tax
enforcement is limited in its resources to trace capital. Therefore,
unlike a fine which exacts a certain penalty for every infraction, a
probationary sentence may prove easy to avoid. More severe punish-
ment, such as incarceration in the case of individuals, and curtailing
the right to conduct business or revoking legal rights altogether in the
case of a corporation, ought to be reserved for tax evasion offenders
who do not abide by their probationary orders.
In order to justify this form of crime-prevention oriented punish-
ment, however, the social acceptance which tax evasion enjoys must
be undermined. This can only be accomplished by the repoliticization
of the public sphere and the revitalization of the citizen in the welfare
state; taxpayers, and especially middle and low income taxpayers,
must be transformed from clients to agents in a renewed welfare state.
In the same spirit by which environmental pollution offences have
been transformed from low profile breaches of municipal by-laws to
high profile violations of moral norms, tax evasion will have to
undergo a similar fall from grace. It would be strange, however, to
imagine a moral system more preoccupied with clean air and safe
water than with social justice.
The solution to tax evasion ultimately rests, however, not only with
exposing or denouncing the offender for what he, she or it is, but with
intensified compliance. Audits, examinations and investigations
should be dramatically increased and tax administrators should be far
more activist in their use of the anti-avoidance provisions contained
in the Act. The administration of the income tax should not become
merely another mechanism for socializing the cost of promoting and
maintaining socioeconomic inequality in Canadian society. Imposing
probationary orders on tax evaders should not, for example, serve to
legitimate the notable absence of regulation or surveillance on the
accumulation of capital generally. Rather, it should be used to dem-
onstrate the merits of regulating the "private" acquisition of income.
The premise and promise of the welfare state must be reclaimed, and
this can only be realized through ensuring continued decommodifica-
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tion of the market, and the preservation of equitably regulated capital-
ist enterprise.
This ambitious project requires, in the long term, reconciling the
ideological contradictions that threaten to collapse the welfare state.
An integral facet of this process, I have argued, is infusing the
administration and enforcement of the income tax with the same
purposive, redistributive spirit as contained in the Act itself. Addition-
ally, the Act itself must be substantively altered to remove the crass
incentives for high-income taxpayers to further enrich themselves.
While the goal may be focusing the politics of income taxation on
questions of enforcement and administration, a necessary step towards
this end remains refocusing the attention of taxpayers on questions of
redistribution. After all, a central reason why tax administration has
been so successfully employed to create an environment conducive to
tax evasion is the absence of a political constituency which advocates
progressive tax reform.' 16 Tax legislation and the enforcement of that
legislation should, in my view, be seen as intimately related problems
with interrelated solutions. Thus, to conclude, tax evasion represents
a violation of fundamental social values leading to deleterious eco-
nomic and political consequences which ought not to be accepted by
the Canadian public. In this paper, I have suggested a different
approach for both apprehending and addressing the incidence of tax
evasion. However, the only lasting solution to tax evasion is social
justice.
116 See for a discussion of this, K. Woodside, "The Symbolic Politics of Corporate
Income Taxation: Canada and Britain, 1945-80," in A. Stone & E. Horphan, eds.,
The Political Economy of Public Policy, 208. See also J. Gilles, "Federal Tax
Reform in a Pluralistic State: Can It Be Done?", in N. Brooks, ed., The Quest For
Tax Reform (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 343; and L. MacDonald, Taxing Com-
prehensive Income: Power and Participation in Canadian Politics, 1962-1975
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985).
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